THE GEOGRAPHY OF FAMILY PRIVACY
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DAVID D. MEYER

In response to Laura A. Rosenbury, Between Home and School, 155 U.
PA. L. REV. 833 (2007).
Scholars are accustomed to thinking about family privacy in terms
of geometry. The allocation of public and private power in domestic
life is classically diagramed as a triangle, representing the separate interests of parent, child, and the state. Parental prerogative in raising
children, on one leg of the triangle, is offset by another leg representing the state’s parens patriae power to ensure the basic welfare of children and their development into productive citizens.
In Between Home and School, Laura Rosenbury intriguingly contends
that this geometry obscures a broader and important geography of fam1
ily privacy. Family law, she argues, tends to relate questions of authority over childrearing to the locations in which it occurs. At home, parents rule the roost; their authority within the sanctity of the home is
protected by a robust constitutional doctrine of parental rights that
gives way to state control only in cases of abuse or neglect. At school,
by contrast, state officials call the shots and parents have no real
2
grounds to object. A fundamental shortcoming of this binary doctrine, she contends, is that it makes no provision for a great deal of
childrearing that takes place in locations other than home and
school—in summer camps, church groups, social organizations, day
3
care centers, and so on. Professor Rosenbury points out that the socialization of children that occurs in these “between” locations is significant, both for children and for society, and she calls for a clearer
articulation of the legal principles respecting childrearing authority in
4
these spaces.
If Professor Rosenbury’s article went no further than this, it would
have made a distinctly valuable contribution by calling attention to the
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lack of scholarship addressing the childrearing that takes place in
these often-influential spaces. Other scholars have begun to address
this shortcoming, importantly taking account of the socializing impact
5
of mass media and similar “environmental” influences on children,
but Professor Rosenbury makes a strong case that a more comprehensive understanding of the distinctive role of “in between” childrearing
is needed.
Professor Rosenbury’s article then goes on to lay the foundation
for such an understanding by suggesting the outlines of a distinctive
normative approach for addressing the socialization of children between home and school. In exploring the appropriate governing
principles, Professor Rosenbury first considers whether the “between”
spaces might be analogized to either home or school, such that the
model of preeminent parental or state authority in those respective
spheres might simply be extended to cover the gaps. She acknowledges, for example, that “[f]amily law’s current silence about . . .
childrearing [between home and school] could reflect, by default, a
normative view of parental control over children in all spaces but
6
school.” Alternatively, “[a]nother approach is to view childrearing
between home and school as an extension of school, confining parental prerogatives (and those of their surrogates) to the privacy of the
7
home.”
She concludes, however, that neither analogy is quite right. The
childrearing that occurs in “between” spaces, often under the direction of actors who are neither parents nor teachers, is different from
in-home care in that it may expose children to values distinct from
those inculcated by their parents. Moreover, because of the diverse
nature of the childrearing influences in these spaces, it is also valuably
different from the more standardized tutelage children are likely to
8
receive at school. Accordingly, “the spaces between home and school
9
may be distinct from both home and school,” occupying a sort of no
man’s land in which neither parental nor state control should totally
dominate. Parents may rule the home and the state may rule the
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school; in between, however, childrearing authority should be shared
by parents, the state, and third parties (e.g., camps, youth groups, and
other entities) that undertake to influence the upbringing of children
in their care. Under this schema, third-party childcare operators
would be largely free to follow their own methods of raising children;
parents would be free to enroll or withdraw their children from these
programs as they saw fit; and the state would be permitted to intervene
(apart from cases of abuse or neglect) for one purpose only: to ensure that third-party actors respect broad values of diversity and plural10
ism in raising children.
Professor Rosenbury’s exploration of the relevance of place in allocating public and private power over childrearing is both ambitious
and important. She is undoubtedly correct that parental authority is
maximal within the privacy of the home and that state educational interests generally overwhelm the preferences of individual parents at
school. She is also right to call for greater attention to the principles
that should govern childrearing outside of home and school, and to
ask whether actors other than parents or guardians might be entitled
to some measure of constitutional protection for their childrearing activities. In a world where children are spending more time in the care
of out-of-home caregivers, and where third-party actors (especially
through mass media) are displacing both parents and schools as the
11
dominant socializing influence on children, these are important matters.
Professor Rosenbury’s analysis is insightful and entirely plausible,
and provokes, for me, two overriding questions:
(1) To what extent is the allocation of childrearing authority properly
determined by the location in which it occurs?
(2) To what extent, if any, should third parties—non-parent actors outside the family—be entitled to assert “privacy” rights to rear other people’s children?

First, in assessing the significance of place in defining childrearing
authority, it bears noting that the space between home and school is
not entirely terra nova for family privacy. Prince v. Massachusetts, for
one, involved a dispute over childrearing between home and school—
specifically, whether a guardian was constitutionally entitled to enlist
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12

her nine-year-old niece in proselytizing on a public street corner.
The Supreme Court ultimately upheld the state’s power to intervene,
but in doing so plainly accepted that parents’ rights under the Constitution extended to the street corner. Although Sarah Prince stood on
a Brockton sidewalk and not in her living room, the Court did not
doubt that she remained within the constitutionally protected “private
13
realm of family life.” She lost only because, under the circumstances
of the case, her conceded parental rights were overcome by a more
powerful state interest—protecting children from the potential detri14
ments of child labor and “the diverse influences of the street.” Even
15
16
Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the foundational family privacy decisions upholding the right of parents to educate their
children in private schools, can be seen as effectively recognizing that
parents’ childrearing rights extend beyond the home.
Prince saw the street corner dispute as involving a “clash” of parental and state powers which required a “delicate” accommodation in
17
“the no man’s land where this battle has gone on.” But the “no
man’s land” that the Court had in mind was surely conceptual rather
than physical or geographic. Indeed, the same clash of powerful parental and state interests occurs at home and at school, as well as the
spaces in between. The state can sometimes reach inside the home to
override parents’ childrearing decisions, even in the absence of child
abuse or neglect. Troxel v. Granville, for example, affirmed the power
of courts, in properly limited cases, to compel parents to make their
18
children available for visitation with persons outside the household.
In doing so, the Court declined to limit the state’s power to cases
where the loss of contact would cause “serious harm” to a child (the
standard used by the state court below), and instead directed only that
courts should give “special weight” to parents’ concerns in assessing
19
whether nonparental visitation is in a child’s best interest. In similar
12
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fashion, the state may reach inside the home to compel parents to
vaccinate their children (even when the risks to children from forgo20
ing the vaccination are not so great as to constitute medical neglect)
and, as Professor Rosenbury acknowledges, may superintend the
21
pedagogical or curricular choices of a home-schooling parent.
By the same token, the clash between parental prerogative and the
state’s interest in a child’s well-being can be found at school as well.
True, a number of state and lower federal court decisions have
dodged parents’ constitutional complaints about school policies on
the ground that parents have no particularized right to control cur22
ricula or otherwise “micro-manage” the schools. Others, however,
have recognized that parents’ fundamental interest in the upbringing
of their children does not vanish at the schoolhouse door, and have
gone on to evaluate school policies on the merits—balancing parental
objections against pedagogical or other interests asserted by the
23
24
state. Runyon v. McCrary, which refused to exempt private, segregated schools from federal laws banning race discrimination, illustrates the second approach. The Court readily acknowledged that
tional only visitation decisions that give “‘no special weight at all’” to parental judgment); David D. Meyer, Lochner Redeemed: Family Privacy After Troxel and Carhart, 48
UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1149 n.128 (2001) (analyzing the significance of Troxel’s “‘special
weight’” language).
20
See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 37 (1905) (upholding mandatory
vaccination law); Spiering v. Heineman, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1140-41 (D. Neb. 2006)
(applying the rational-basis test to uphold a statute requiring parents to submit newborn infants for routine blood testing, regardless of whether birth occurs at home or in
a hospital); Alicia Novak, Comment, The Religious and Philosophical Exemptions to StateCompelled Vaccination: Constitutional and Other Challenges, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1101,
1104-07 (2005) (detailing, in brief, the legal history of state-mandated vaccinations).
21
See, e.g., Combs v. Homer Ctr. Sch. Dist., 468 F. Supp. 2d 738, 778-79 (W.D. Pa.
2006) (upholding a state’s power to regulate the content and manner of home-school
education); Steven G. Gey, Free Will, Religious Liberty, and a Partial Defense of the French
Approach to Religious Expression in Public Schools, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 75-78 (2005) (discussing the state’s role in ensuring that each home-schooled child receives an adequate
education).
22
See, e.g., Crowley v. McKinney, 400 F.3d 965, 969-71 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that
while parents have a constitutional right to choose between schools, they do not have a
right to “participate in the school’s management”), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1033 (2005);
Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that parents have “no constitutional right . . . to prevent a public school from providing its students with whatever [appropriate] information it wishes to provide”), cert. denied, 127 S.
Ct. 725 (2006).
23
See, e.g., Miranda Perry, Comment, Kids and Condoms: Parental Involvement in
School Condom-Distribution Programs, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 727, 727 (1996) (arguing that
school-sponsored condom-distribution programs can withstand constitutional scrutiny
only if they require parental consent).
24
427 U.S. 160 (1976).
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while state control of private school admissions “does not represent
governmental intrusion into the privacy of the home or a similarly intimate setting, it does implicate parental interests” rooted in the con25
stitutional right of privacy. The state’s imposition was nevertheless
26
justified because it was “reasonable.”
Professor Rosenbury surveys the landscape of family privacy and
sees three distinct territories: home, school, and in between. She
proposes to embrace the location of childrearing as a basic organizing
principle for family privacy analysis, employing different legal standards to assess claims of childrearing autonomy in each of the three
territories. Basically ceding the home to parents and schools to the
state, she proposes a special rule for the distinctive space in between
in order to balance the legitimate private and public interests at play
there. My own inclination is to focus on the essential similarities connecting all three categories, and to emphasize that, in all locations, resolving family privacy disputes inevitably requires balancing the liberties of family members against the interests of the state in protecting
children from harm and ensuring their healthy development. Rather
than set out distinctive legal standards for each childrearing space, a
single balancing framework might accomplish the same task with
greater sensitivity to the endlessly variable exigencies that may arise.
Location clearly should matter to this balancing. The state might
have stronger justifications for restricting certain childrearing practices in public places (say, family nudism, to borrow from one of Pro27
fessor Rosenbury’s illustrative cases, or the infliction of corporal punishment) than it would have if the practices were confined entirely
within the home. Certainly, constitutional doctrine has long recognized an extra measure of privacy protection for the home. Lawrence
v. Texas, for example, observed that constitutional privacy (or “liberty,” as Lawrence prefers) has both decisional and “spatial” dimensions, with added protection for the “dwelling or other private

25

Id. at 178.
Runyon reasoned:
The Court has repeatedly stressed that while parents have a constitutional
right to send their children to private schools and a constitutional right to select private schools that offer specialized instruction, they have no constitutional right to provide their children with private school education unfettered
by reasonable government regulation.
26
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28

places.” By the same token, Prince held that “[t]he state’s authority
over children’s activities” is enlarged when the conduct occurs “in
29
public places.”
Location is relevant to the measure of parental rights for several
reasons. Professor Rosenbury cogently points out that location matters to children because the guidance they receive in “between” places
from community members may be different from the tutelage they receive at home or school and is therefore uniquely beneficial. In addition, location surely matters to parents because the intrusion they feel
will be far greater when they are told how to behave in their own
home than elsewhere. And location matters to the state because the assertion of parental prerogative outside the home may impose significant externalities. This, in fact, seems to be the primary concern driving courts to reject parental attempts to control school curricula or
other policies: accommodating the idiosyncratic preferences of individual parents may well diminish the educational experience of other
30
children and financially burden school districts.
Each of these considerations counsels taking account of place—
any assessment of the constitutionality of state regulation of childrearing must weigh the burden on parents and children against the public
costs and benefits—but how exactly? Professor Rosenbury’s framework would fix the bar differently for home, school, and in between.
She appears to accept that childrearing within the home should be
31
subject to intervention only in cases of abuse or neglect, and that
state control over childrearing in the public schools is essentially un32
fettered by parental rights. In between, Professor Rosenbury would
permit the state to regulate childrearing only to enhance children’s
exposure to diverse values and ways of life. Under this standard, the
state could compel the Boy Scouts, for example, to admit gay scoutmasters (furthering pluralism), but could not require parents or
guardians to accompany their children to nudist youth camps (since
33
the requirement would do nothing to enhance pluralism).
28

539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944).
30
As Judge Richard Posner observed in rejecting a parent’s claimed right of access
to school grounds and records, “Imagine if a parent insisted on sitting in on each of
her child’s classes in order to monitor the teacher’s performance or on vetoing curricular choices, texts, and assignments.” Crowley v. McKinney, 400 F.3d 965, 969 (7th
Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1033 (2005).
31
See Rosenbury, supra note 1, at 833-34 (discussing the scope of parental rights
within the home).
32
See id. at 869-71 (discussing parental rights at school).
33
See id. at 895-97 (applying her proposed normative framework to the facts of Boy
29
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This stratified approach could bring greater predictability to family privacy analysis, but would do so by limiting the considerations that
otherwise might inform the necessary balancing. Whether the gain
would be worth its costs is uncertain. It seems to me, for example,
that enhancing children’s exposure to diversity is not the only public
interest that might properly justify state regulation of childrearing between home and school. I am not convinced, for example, that the
state’s ability to impose modest regulations intended to ensure the
safety of children participating in a back-country wilderness program,
or to reduce the danger of sexual imposition at a nudist camp for adolescents, should depend on proof that the hazards would otherwise
constitute abuse or neglect. Likewise, regulatory burdens in the pursuit of pluralism should be justified by some demonstration that the
benefits to children will in fact be substantial. If childrearing outside
the home genuinely deserves significant constitutional protection, as it
surely does, then we should insist on assurances that the public benefit
truly outweighs the impositions on private choice. If applied rigidly, a
categorical and exclusive allowance for state regulation mandating inclusiveness or pluralism in out-of-home childrearing might allow at
once too little state intervention (barring safety-oriented regulations
absent hazards amounting to neglect) and too much (permitting all
inclusion-oriented regulation without a demonstration of its substantial benefits).
Alternatively, location could be used not as an organizing principle, but as a more indeterminate factor in calibrating the strength of
justification required of the state for any intervention in childrearing.
Courts might continue to demand more compelling justification for
state supervision of childrearing in the home, while gradually relaxing
their expectations as the location of the regulated activity shifts to
34
ever-more public places. In this way, location could take its place
alongside other factors traditionally considered by the courts when determining the appropriate level of scrutiny in family-privacy controversies—such as the degree and quality of the state’s imposition, the degree to which affected family members are united or divided in
opposing the state’s intervention, and the traditionality or novelty of

Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000), and White Tail Park, Inc. v. Stroube, 413
F.3d 451 (4th Cir. 2005)).
34
Cf. Rosenbury, supra note 1, at 874 (acknowledging that “when the childrearing
traditionally performed within the home moves to organizations outside of the home,
it is conceivable that the privacy accorded to such childrearing should gradually give
way to state interests”).
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35

the regulation.
Those who are distrustful of the ability or willingness of courts to
apply such balancing tests with sensitivity and restraint may well prefer
Professor Rosenbury’s proposed approach. One could reasonably fear
that the indeterminacy of multi-factor balancing will lead too many
judges to undervalue privacy, especially the privacy of families whose
methods of childrearing do not conform to prevailing social conven36
tions. From that vantage point, cabining the judicial role through
the crisper lines suggested by Professor Rosenbury—including the
privileged place given to the state’s pursuit of pluralistic values in
childrearing between home and school—may appear to strike exactly
the right balance.
The second major question Professor Rosenbury’s article raises
concerns the rights-holding status given to third-party actors who engage in childrearing. Professor Rosenbury posits that third parties
who socialize children (including entities such as the Boy Scouts and
summer camps) should enjoy constitutionally protected autonomy “to
engage in the childrearing of their choice, much as parents are per37
mitted—and even encouraged—to do.” This seems to imply that
these actors should be recognized as holding family privacy rights of
their own, a proposition sure to be controversial and yet one that coincides with tentative and fledgling efforts to recognize privacy rights
in persons other than parents. The Supreme Court in 1977 hesitated
to recognize foster parents as holding family privacy rights in Smith v.
38
Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform. But more recently,
in Troxel v. Granville, Justice Stevens was prepared to recognize that
children could potentially hold privacy rights in maintaining “familial
39
or family-like bonds” with non-parents; and Justice Scalia agreed that
a gradual extension of family-privacy rights to others outside the parent-child relationship was the inevitable implication of the Court’s

35

For a fuller defense of the relevance of these factors, see David D. Meyer, The
Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 VAND. L. REV. 527, 579-94 (2000).
36
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Nuclear Families in American Constitutional Law and Policy Reform, 66 MO. L. REV. 527, 535
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37
Rosenbury, supra note 1, at 895.
38
431 U.S. 816, 846-47 (1977) (declining to resolve the issue of foster parents’ liberty interests, but suggesting that any such rights are attenuated in comparison with
those of natural parents).
39
530 U.S. 57, 88 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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doctrine. It is therefore possible to imagine that third parties who
care for children might be accorded childrearing rights. Yet, the parties who have prevailed in the lower courts so far have all been intimately bound to the children in their care. The “de facto parent” who
assumes a parenting partnership with a legal parent surely stands in a
different position from the Boy Scouts or the neighborhood day care
provider.
Could it be that private associations that engage in childrearing
(as opposed to adult socializing or charity work, for example) are entitled to an extra measure of public deference under the Constitution?
I think that is entirely plausible, and Professor Rosenbury makes a
substantial case that such a principle would benefit children. At the
same time, I think it likely that the deference would hinge ultimately
on respect for parental preferences, not on any independent childrearing role of the association.
Several rationales undergird parental rights under the Constitution. Respecting the childrearing liberty of individual parents promotes, as Professor Rosenbury observes, pluralism in families and social values by preventing the state from seeking to “standardize”
41
But the task of pluralizing
children according to a single ideal.
childrearing is entrusted to parents, as opposed to child-development
professionals, neighbors, or other caring neutrals, for good reason.
First, parents are presumed to be best situated to protect their children’s welfare because of “the emotional attachments that derive from
42
the intimacy of daily association.” As Emily Buss has cogently put the
point, “Parents’ strong emotional attachment to their children and
considerable knowledge of their particular needs make parents the
child-specific experts most qualified to assess and pursue their chil-

40

See id. at 92-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing judicial vindication of parental
rights). For a full exploration, see JAMES G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF
CHILDREN (2006) (analyzing children’s rights when the state makes decisions about
their personal relationships).
41
Rosenbury, supra note 1, at 882; see also Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
535 (1925) (“The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this
Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by
forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only.”); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923) (“[T]he means adopted [to foster a homogeneous people
with American ideals]exceed the limitations upon the power of the State and conflict
with rights assured to plaintiff . . . .”); MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 24-33 (2005) (exploring the theoretical foundations of the Supreme Court’s protection of parental rights).
42
Smith, 431 U.S. at 844.
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dren’s best interests in most circumstances.” In addition, to the extent that substantive due process rights rest on social consensus about
the limits of government power, social consensus has long looked to
parents as the natural guardians of their children. Neither of these
rationales would provide much support for recognizing free-standing
childrearing rights in caregivers outside the family circle. Out-ofhome caregivers or youth groups, lacking the “intimacy of daily association” shared within the family, are unlikely to share the exceptional
knowledge and motivation of parents, and social consensus has clearly
not regarded such parties as beyond the reach of government regulation.
Although I am doubtful that third-party actors such as the Boy
Scouts or summer camps can qualify as holders of constitutional childrearing rights of their own, it strikes me as quite plausible that they
might be given third-party standing to assert the constitutional rights
of parents in some instances. Since Professor Rosenbury does not envision that third-party childrearing rights could operate to limit the
prerogatives of parents, standing to assert the rights of parents to enroll their children would likely accomplish the same result in any
event.
In summary, Professor Rosenbury makes a strong and thoughtful
case that more systematic attention must be paid to the childrearing
that takes place between home and school. She also makes an important start toward that goal by challenging family law and constitutional
scholars to account for the relevance of place and third-party caregivers in the modern law of family privacy. The debate on these questions is likely to unfold for many years to come, but it has already been
enriched by Professor Rosenbury’s excellent and provocative article.
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